0
0
Adiraj Bhoumick
FACTS
Balram Singh, who filed a writ petition claiming that the intent of the ordinance was infringed under Article 32 of the Constitution, opposed the ordinance being referred to as The Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Ordinance, 2020. This ordinance made changes into the provisions of service conditions of members in different tribunals in India.
According to the ordinance, the Union Government had a strong say in making appointments, tenure, and conditions of service of tribunal members taking place of what was contained in the statutes and in the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court. Significantly, it also shortened the tenure of members to four years (with reappointment rights) made executive appointments to be at its own mandate and made changes in the age limit and qualification of chairpersons and members.
Balram Singh claimed that such stipulations contradicted the judicial precedents like the madras bar association v. Union of India (2014, 2019) that had stressed that tribunals had to be made independent on executive form of interference. This petitioner urged that the ordinance committed an infringement of principle of separation of powers, independence of the judiciary and Article 14 of the Constitution in terms of devolution of too much discretion to the government.
Union of India justified the ordinance by their claim that the ordinance was enacted with an aim of making working of tribunals easier, uniform and more efficient. It claimed that the legislature was in full capacity to make such legislations and the judiciary should not interfere with the area of policy of the legislature.
The situation was subjected to hearing together with other petitions of the provisions of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, as the ordinance was substituted by the legislation afterwards. The Supreme court was compelled to find out whether the executive seized powers to appoint and tell conditions to tribunals was against the constitution and the already given court orders.
ISSUES
Whether the ordinance (later Act) undermines judicial independence by granting excessive control to the executive over tribunals.
Whether the reduction of tenure and alteration of service conditions of tribunal members is unconstitutional.
Whether the ordinance violates Articles 14, 21, and 50 of the Constitution by affecting fairness and separation of powers
LAW
Article 14 – Right to equality, arbitrariness in all executive control of tribunals.
Article 14 gives the protection of equality before the law to every one of the citizens and forbids arbitrariness in the action of the state. The act prohibits the state against any arbitrary act that has the propensity of fostering inequality of equals.
Article 21 – Right to Liberty and Life.
Article 21 ensures a right to life and to personal liberty, comprising of the right to a just and unbiased adjudicatory mechanism. Considering tribunals which in most cases replace High Courts, lack independence, the purity of proceedings under Article 21 is undermined.
Article 32 – The authority in order to enforce fundamental rights in Supreme Court.
Article 32 gives every individual a right to take direct access to the Supreme Court to expose fundamental rights breach. The petitioner applied this provision with regard to seeing the ordinance as unconstitutional.
Article 50 – Ruling Principle where judicial separation must be observed between the executive and the judiciary.
This is a Director Principle in Article 50 which points to the separation of body Forms (judicial and executive). Although not justiciable, it compiles a constitutional commitment that tribunals that exercise judicial functions must not be influenced by the executive.
The Tribunal Reforms Ordinance, 2020 and Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021.
Also, the statutory basis of the challenge is the Tribunal Reforms Ordinance, 2020, and its further counterpart, the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021.
Cases in point: Union of India v. R. Gandhi (2010); Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2014, 2019).
Union of India v. R. Gandhi (2010) as well as Madras Bar Association v. are some of its precedents. Independence in tribunal models is given priority in the constitutional provision by Union of India (2014, 2019) that informs the legal framework under consideration.
ARGUMENTS BY PETITIONER
The petitioner argued that the ordinance interfered with independence of the tribunals as the Union Government had taken-at-will authority in appointments, reappointments and conditions of services. Courts, he said, were independent under the fundamental system of the Constitution and the tribunal though a creation of statute had Judicial functions and thus could not be subject to Executive interferences.
This shrinkage of tenure length by 5 years (as an earlier suggestion) to four years with option of re tiny become a source of toil to the members of the tribunal since they now were at the mercy of the government to retain them. This went against the principle of judicial tenure as a non-partisan position.
It was also not courted to grant the binding directions of the Supreme Court as presented in cases of Madras Bar Association where it had prescribed the minimum standards as concerns the qualification, the age of retirement, and term in tribunal, and the independence of members of the tribunal. By disregarding said judicial pronouncements by executive, a process of trying to override the judicial powers was defied and therefore, the separation of powers was compromised.
The petitioner also stated that a short term of office demoralized qualified lawyers and judges to take positions of the tribunal thus frustrating the system of administration of justice. The alternations were also in breach of the Article 14 since they made inequitable categorizations amid tribunal judges and ordinary judges of the High Court.
Finally, he argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional and arbitrary in that it was solely implemented to power it over and not to enhance efficiency. Such provisions repressed access to justice according to Article 21 because their effect was a violation of an impartial adjudication.
ARGUMENTS BY RESPONDENT
Union of India contended that ordinance was constitutionally in place and was passed within the competence of the legislature of parliament. It argued that the tribunals are statutory, not constitutional institutions, and thus the legislature can rightfully establish its structure, its composition and conditions of service.
The government argued that the intention of the ordinance was to consolidate the management of the tribuals as well as to create some form of standardization of service terms in the inter-tribunal settings. The preceding system grounded on ad hoc guidelines on the judiciary led to confusion, problems with appointments which resulted in vacancies. The system would have greater efficiency and accountability by putting vesting power of appointment in the hands of the executive.
When asked about the tenure, the respondent asserted that four years of tenure followed by a possibility of being reelected was sufficient to continueity as well as accountability. The tribunal members are statutory incumbent unlike constitutional judges who remain in office until a prescribed retirement age hence the conditions are allowable. The executive positioned that Articles 14 was not violated by such differentiation.
What the government also argued is that the judicial precedents like Madras Bar Association are unable to thwart the implementation of a new legislation by Parliament. Judicial directives were not enforced beyond the time Parliament made a legislature, and as soon as law was made these directives were terminated.
Lastly, the respondent alleged that tribunals were part of the field of policy making to the Parliament and the executive and the courts had no authorization to interfere with parliamentary policy, unless it was apparent, unconstitutional. As the point of the ordinance was to have efficiency, accountability, and a swift justice system, it was in the democratic privilege of the legislature.
ANALYSIS
The case involved the issue of judicial independence and executive power over regulatory tribunals. Although not constitutional courts, tribunals are courts that adjudicate on the case of disputes which tend to substitute or even to complement the jurisdiction of High Courts. Therefore, their independence is a necessity in a constitutional point of view in Articles 14 and 21.
A basic structure doctrine, which involves judicial independence as sacred, was a good point on which the petitioner could persuade by his claim. The Supreme Court in several occasions (R. Gandhi, Madras Bar Association) had pointed out the fact that the executive cannot manipulate how tribunals are run. Tenure had been lowered, the reagents of government discretion had been made on reappointment, and the age qualifications had been watered down by the ordinance which seemed calculated to weaken such safeguards.
The respondent based his argument on the supremacy of legislation by arguing that, the Parliament has the power to govern the tribunals. Although legally sound, this stance did not take into consideration the fact that Parliament is restricted in its powers of making the law by the Romans. An act that is not in line with basic rights or the basic structure can be invalidated.
The point that judicial precedents were temporary until law action was taken was partially right. The ordinance and later enactment of the Acts however did not consider the nature of such judgments which required structural independence a constitutional warranty and not a transient measure.
The executive reliance of the four-year tenure with restraint reappointment languishes is the insecurity that goes against the concept of fair assessment. The anterior principle of Article 50 enhances the argument of independence of quasi-judiciaries. Also, short tenure and terms may render the tribunal unfair in attracting skilled professionals thus posing additional challenge to access to justice.
Conversely, one cannot disregard the concerns of the government regarding delays and vacancies in tribunals. The next way out, however, is not centralizing executive power but putting effective processes in place that are supportive of constitutional values.
Hence, the hajj principle of independence prescribed in the constitution takes precedence over administrative conveniences. The ordinance and then the Tribunal Reforms Act bypassed judicially recommended safeguards and so it could be invalidated as unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The case emphasizes the precarious nature of the process between legislative policy-making and the constitutional protection. Although parliament can regulate the statutory tribunals, it is not an absolute power. The basic structuring of the Constitution includes judicial independence which should also be granted to tribunals performing judicial functions.
Striking a balance between tenure and executive reappointment by decreasing the tenure and overturning the Supreme Court instructions, the ordinance and successor Act undermined tribunal independence. Efficiency and uniformity were justified issues as they could not be used to treat fundamental constitutional principles to shame.
Therefore, the petition emphasized that the tribunals should be left out of the influence of the executive to ensure an unbiased presidential ruling, as well as uphold essential right in Articles 14 and 21. Courts in precedent cases like the Madras Bar Association are judicial guidelines that still exist as standards in the design of the tribunals. Enhancement of independence of quasi-judicial causes is a constitutional priority as opposed to adopting executive control.
