Shamyana Parveen from Bikash Bharti Law College, Calcutta University
FACTS OF THE CASE
The case post-1952 dealt with the Government of India which mandated an investigation into the conduct of a firm that went bankrupt under the Companies Act 1913. This modus operandi triggered the investigation following the act of embezzlement of funds and regalia of balance sheet and accounts from the corporation’s shareholders. This assured that the dishonest and fraudulent transactions will be punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code 1860.
Therefore, FIR was filed in 1953 and for getting the warrant to search the place; application was moved before the District Magistrate under Section 96 CrPC. This warrant was duly made by the District Magistrate, and in connection with it, fifty-two searches and seizures were conducted at number thirty-four different places. In his or her petition to the Supreme Court, the Petitioner sought annulling of the search warrants as they infringed the constitutionally enshrined Articles 19(1)(f) and 20(3) and also got back the materials that were seized.
ISSUE
Whether the power to search and seize materials granted by the CrPC was violative of Article 19(1) (f) and Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
ARGUMENTS
Concerning the petitioner’s claims, he said that the investigation had infringed his Article 19(1) (f) a right on freedom to acquire, own, and dispose of property. They said that the search that was conducted was unsound and violates their rights due to intrusion into their premises, seizure of documents as well as tarnishing their image.
The petitioner also stated that Wachovia committed a constitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment’s compulsory self-incrimination clause in searching for the document. As bases on the petition and relying on the case laws of the United States the petitioner contended that the provision Article 20 (3) should not be confined to written testimony as well as oral testimony. It was the petitioner’s submission that the search was the equivalent of the compelled delivery of the subpoena and was thus nothing but forced testimony prohibited under Article 20 (3). In support of this allegation, the petitioner relied on the Supreme Court’s decision interpreting an amendment of the United States Constitution, that is the fourth amendment.
JUDGEMENT
The court also dismissed the direct violation by the petitioner of the right to acquire, retain, or dispose of property through the seizure procedure. The court then opined that the attempt or carrying out of the investigation would not devoid people of the right to the property. Besides, the court stated that the raids involved acquisition of property from the stakeholders which was temporary and limited and the state could take the total control of the goods that were confiscated during the search. It was also noted that the confiscation means that the disposal of the property is temporarily prevented, but it does not affect the fundamental rights.
Subsequently, the courts considered whether the employee was within the first or second aggressive act prohibition at the time his actions were observed.
Article 20 (3) of The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the right to protection from self-incrimination. He pointed out that the availability of the law set police on clamorous investigation rather than on confessions and considered arguments about theoretical knowledge of self-discrimination. Against this backdrop, it held that rights cannot be construed in a technical way and confining them to the bare words of the provision but instead, should be given a liberal construction which should be of pari materia with the tenor of the cardinal right. .. Thus, protection from compulsory testimony encompasses not only the provision of Article 20 (1) regarding appearance as an oral witness, but also the protection for compulsory production of witnesses as provided in Article 20 (3) because the provision in the latter says “become a witness” and not “appear as a witness”. I understand. document. Moreover, that under the Law of Evidence it was pointed out that one can take into custody of the document and testify as a witness in other ways. Thus, it has been concluded that Article 20 (3) is applicable to both document preparation and verbal evidence.
However, the court disagreed with the petitioner’s allegation that the investigation and seizure were a substitute for the subpoena, and found that the warrant was addressed to government officials rather than the owner of the facility during the investigation and seizure process. Therefore, the defendant has no evidence to play in the search. It was the actions of high ranking government officials who submitted the evidence, not the defendants who were forced to testify. The petitioner, citing the US Supreme Court’s decision to interpret Article 4 of the US Constitutional Amendment, argued that the search and seizure of documents was equivalent to a compulsory preparation in violation of Article 20 (3). The court dismissed this allegation and found that the Indian Constitution did not include the same basic rights to privacy as Article 4 of the US Constitutional Amendment. The court refused to adopt the principles of Article 4 of the Constitutional Amendment in the form of right to privacy.
The court did not accept the petitioner’s plea in this regard and observing that the investigation and seizure were a substitute for the subpoena, the court also found that the warrant was made to government officials as against the owner of the facility. Thus, the defendant has no part to play in relation to the search. An implication was that while it involved high-ranking government officials who submitted the evidence, it was the defendants who were forced to testify. Pursuant to the previous decision of the US Supreme Court in which the Court has interpreted the Article 4 of the US Constitutional Amendment, the petitioner stressed that search and seizure of documents was akin to compulsory preparation within the prohibition of Article 20(3). The court threw out this aspect of the allegation and concluded that the Indian Constitution did not incorporate similar basic rights to privacy enshrined in the Article 4 of US Constitutional Amendment. In civil cases, the court declined to apply the provisions of Article 4 of Constitutional Amendment in terms of the right to privacy.
ANALYSIS
For this, the author is in support of the Court regarding the result in terming the present case not as one of the violations of right to privacy and the Article 20(3), i.e., right against self-incrimination. The present case involves search and seizure which is an essential area of criminal law; if it were not for it criminal law would limit itself to a few areas. As much as it is recognized that the best judgement should always be produced when evidence is presented, this is often not possible. The problem with this direction is that if the Court did treat the case as violation of Article 20(3) and Article 19(1)(f) which despite having been struck down due to its inapplicability in the present case, plays a very critical role, it would hinder the delivery of justice. The bench has correctly pointed out that search and seizure is indispensable for the preservation of social security and that the process of search and seizure is a temporary intervention that did not require legislative recognition. Search and seizure power is the sweeping power in the society for protection of social security and like all powers; it must be governed by the law. Therefore, there can be no justification of the right to privacy as a fundamental right when the country’s constitution does not include it.
The process of search and seizure is thus a reasonable restriction of the freedoms under the Constitution which could not be held unconstitutional. Additionally, it can also be pointed out that many countries including the USA also permit the removal of the clause of fundamental rights and reasonable restrictions in the cases necessary. Moreover, the right against self-incrimination does not encompass evidence and witnesses as has rightly been mentioned by the Hon’ble bench of this Hon’ble court. Therefore, to assure justice for the victim, it constitutes a part of the process that must be accomplished. Therefore, find a decision in the present case.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the case of MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra can be rightly termed as the dawn of the right to privacy in India’s Apex Court. An eight-judge constitution bench held that; the right to privacy is not protected under Article 21 of the Indian constitution, Search and seizure is essential for the protection of social security, the search and seizure power being a temporary interference for which statutory recognition is not essential was held to be a reasonable restriction of the constitutional right that could not be declared unconstitutional The decision was partially overruled in the KS Puttaswamy judgement however, it exists partly.
REFERENCES
- https://www.legallore.info/post/m-p-sharma-vs-satish-chandra-case
- https://vidhinama.com/case-analysis-m-p-sharma-and-ors-v-satish-chandra-district-magistrate-delhi-and-ors-air-1954-sc-300/
- https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-4189-m-p-sharma-and-others-v-s-satish-chandra-district-magistrate.html
- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1306519/