The Governor: Between Constitutional Morality and Political Maneuvering

The recent Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) has reignited one of the oldest debates  in Indian constitutionalism, ‘the role of Governors in a federal polity’. Triggered by the  Supreme Court’s April 8, 2025 judgment in the State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu  case, which declared Governor R.N. Ravi’s delay in granting assent to ten Bills  unconstitutional. The Court prescribed a three month time frame for Governors and the  President to decide on Bills, holding that the constitution does not permit a “pocket veto” over  the will of an elected legislature.  

The Union government, however, expressed strong reservations and argued that judicially  imposed timelines amount to a ‘straitjacket’ amendment of the constitution, contrary to the  intentions of the Constituent Assembly. At the core of this disagreement lies a larger  constitutional question: is the Governor a neutral constitutional figure safeguarding federal  balance, or an extended arm of the Centre to check state government?  

The April 8 judgment marked an emphatic judicial stance against gubernatorial inaction. By  insisting that assent must be granted “as soon as possible”, the Court underscored constitutional  accountability and democratic functioning. Chief Justice posed a pointed question, “if the  governor sits on Bills from 2020 to 2025, should the Court sit powerless?”. The Centre,  however, pushed back. Attorney General R. Venkataramani and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta  argued that deadlines would constitute judicial amendment of the Constitution. They  emphasized that the Constituent Assembly had deliberately dropped a proposed six week limit  for assent, replacing it with the flexible phrase “as soon as possible”. According to the Centre,  impasses between State governments and Governors should be resolved politically, not through  judicial intervention.  

Several BJP ruled states like Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Goa, and others supported this position,  asserting that if a Governor misuses authority, it is for Parliament to address, not the judiciary.  In contrast, states such as non-BJP ruled like Kerala and Tamil Nadu accused the Centre of  using the Presidential Reference to indirectly overturn a binding judicial precedent.  

The Constitutional Position: Article 163 and 200  

At the core of the debate lies the assertion of central authority, which generates tension between  the provisions of Article 163 and Article 200 of the constitution. Article 163 requires the  Governor to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in matters where  discretion is expressly permitted. Article 200 empowers the Governor to grant assent, withhold  assent, or reserve a bill for the President’s consideration, but it does not specify a time frame.  

The Centre has argued that this silence implies discretion, allowing Governors to indefinitely  withhold assent. Yet, such an interpretation risks subverting legislative supremacy at the State  level. If gubernatorial discretion is stretched too far, it effectively allows the unelected office  to override the mandate of an elected assembly, eroding federal balance. Attorney General  Venkataramani, while arguing in the Apex Court, drew attention to the 42nd Amendment of  1976, which explicitly bound the President to act on the advice of the Union Cabinet under  Article 74(1), while leaving Article 163 untouched. He argued that this asymmetry reflects a  deliberate choice, unlike the President, Governors are not always bound by ministerial advice.  Yet this interpretation overlooks the political context of the Emergency. The 42nd Amendment  was crafted in December 1976, when all States were under Central control. The amendment 

sought to concentrate power at the Centre, restraining the President but leaving Governors as  flexible instruments of central authority. The fact that subsequent governments retained this  provision reveals political convenience rather than principled constitutional design. To invoke  the 42nd Amendment as a justification for arbitrary gubernatorial power today risks repeating  the authoritarian tendencies of the Emergency. The deeper question is whether the Centre  intends to respect federalism or to diminish it into a mere formal construct, thereby risking a  return to an Emergency era authoritarian government, rather than honoring the constitutional  spirit of cooperative federalism.  

Centre-State Relations: A Historical Evolution  

Until 1967, centre-state relations remained largely smooth under Congress’s dominance at both  the centre and state levels. The electoral setback of the Congress in nine states in 1967 marked  the beginning of a new era, as opposition ruled states challenged growing centralization and  demanded greater autonomy. Since then, Governors have frequently become instruments of  political maneuvering, used by the Centre to destabilize state governments.  

The Constituent Assembly, while rejecting the ideal of elected Governors, emphasized their  neutrality. B.R. Ambedkar argued that the Centre and States would function in separate  domains unless an internal emergency arose. The office of the Governor was designed as an  impartial constitutional head, not as a political agent of the Centre. The Apex Court too has  clarified that the Governor is not an employee of the Central government but an independent  constitutional office. Nevertheless, political practice has often departed from this principle.  

Several commissions have highlighted the dangers of excessive centralization and misuse of  the Governor’s office. Administrative Reforms Commission (1966), chaired by Morarji Desai,  has stressed the need for Governors to adopt a non-partisan attitude for effective coordination.  Sarkaria Commission (1988) warned that “over centralization leads to blood pressure at the  Centre and anaemia at the periphery,” recommending that if assent is withheld, reasons should  be communicated to the state government. Punchhi Commission (2007) emphasized  “Cooperative federalism” as the key to sustaining India’s unity and recommended that  Governors should decide on Bills within six months. The Apex court’s ruling on many matters,  along with these recommendations, reflects a consistent theme that “the Governor must act as  a constitutional guardian, not as an agent of the Centre.”  

The centre’s arguments rest heavily on the literal reading of Article 200, which omits timelines.  But constitutional interpretation cannot be confined to the text alone, it must also reflect the  spirit. The phrase “as soon as possible” was not meant to allow indefinite delay. Rather, it  reflects the framers expectations of constitutional morality, that Governors would act swiftly,  using discretion only in exceptional cases such as anti-constitutional or secessionist legislation.  The framers decision to employ the expression “union of India” rather than “Federation” was  shaped profoundly by the traumatic experience of Partition. While the term “Federation” was  consciously avoided, the constitution nonetheless incorporates all substantive features of  federalism. Hypothetically, if a leader with overwhelming parliamentary dominance were to  argue, on the basis of nomenclature alone, that India is not a federation and could thereby alter  its federal character, such a claim might appear textually defensible. However, a principled  reading of the Constitution reveals that federalism forms part of its basic structure. The framers  intent was to forestall further secessionist tendencies, not to establish an authoritarian Centre. 

To invoke this historical choice as a rationale for expanding arbitrary gubernatorial powers is,  therefore, a distortion of the constitutional spirit.  

Conclusion  

The Governor’s office was never intended to be a partisan tool of the Centre. Yet in practice,  successive governments have used it to interfere in State politics. The present controversy  illustrates the recurring tension between the letter and spirit of the Constitution. If the Centre  insists on interpreting Article 200 literally, allowing Governors to withhold assent indefinitely,  it risks undermining federalism and legislative supremacy in the states. Judicial intervention,  therefore, becomes necessary to preserve constitutional balance.  

Ultimately, the debate is not about the power of individuals but about the health of Indian  democracy. If the Governor is allowed to become an instrument of central dominance,  federalism, the core of the Constitution, will be eroded. The path forward must be one of  cooperative federalism, guided by constitutional morality rather than political expediency.