{"id":5683,"date":"2025-09-23T11:46:12","date_gmt":"2025-09-23T06:16:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/?p=5683"},"modified":"2025-09-23T11:49:47","modified_gmt":"2025-09-23T06:19:47","slug":"the-governor-between-constitutional-morality-and-political-maneuvering","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/2025\/09\/23\/the-governor-between-constitutional-morality-and-political-maneuvering\/","title":{"rendered":"The Governor: Between Constitutional Morality and Political Maneuvering"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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Author: \u00a0Ashish Kumar Singh, law Student at faculty of law, DU<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t

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The recent Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) has reignited one of the oldest debates\u00a0 in Indian constitutionalism, \u2018the role of Governors in a federal polity\u2019. Triggered by the\u00a0 Supreme Court\u2019s April 8, 2025 judgment in the State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu\u00a0 case, which declared Governor R.N. Ravi\u2019s delay in granting assent to ten Bills\u00a0 unconstitutional. The Court prescribed a three month time frame for Governors and the\u00a0 President to decide on Bills, holding that the constitution does not permit a \u201cpocket veto\u201d over\u00a0 the will of an elected legislature.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Union government, however, expressed strong reservations and argued that judicially\u00a0 imposed timelines amount to a \u2018straitjacket\u2019 amendment of the constitution, contrary to the\u00a0 intentions of the Constituent Assembly. At the core of this disagreement lies a larger\u00a0 constitutional question: is the Governor a neutral constitutional figure safeguarding federal\u00a0 balance, or an extended arm of the Centre to check state government?\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The April 8 judgment marked an emphatic judicial stance against gubernatorial inaction. By\u00a0 insisting that assent must be granted \u201cas soon as possible\u201d, the Court underscored constitutional\u00a0 accountability and democratic functioning. Chief Justice posed a pointed question, \u201cif the\u00a0 governor sits on Bills from 2020 to 2025, should the Court sit powerless?\u201d. The Centre,\u00a0 however, pushed back. Attorney General R. Venkataramani and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta\u00a0 argued that deadlines would constitute judicial amendment of the Constitution. They\u00a0 emphasized that the Constituent Assembly had deliberately dropped a proposed six week limit\u00a0 for assent, replacing it with the flexible phrase \u201cas soon as possible\u201d. According to the Centre,\u00a0 impasses between State governments and Governors should be resolved politically, not through\u00a0 judicial intervention.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Several BJP ruled states like Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Goa, and others supported this position,\u00a0 asserting that if a Governor misuses authority, it is for Parliament to address, not the judiciary.\u00a0 In contrast, states such as non-BJP ruled like Kerala and Tamil Nadu accused the Centre of\u00a0 using the Presidential Reference to indirectly overturn a binding judicial precedent.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Constitutional Position: Article 163 and 200\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the core of the debate lies the assertion of central authority, which generates tension between\u00a0 the provisions of Article 163 and Article 200 of the constitution. Article 163 requires the\u00a0 Governor to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in matters where\u00a0 discretion is expressly permitted. Article 200 empowers the Governor to grant assent, withhold\u00a0 assent, or reserve a bill for the President\u2019s consideration, but it does not specify a time frame.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Centre has argued that this silence implies discretion, allowing Governors to indefinitely\u00a0 withhold assent. Yet, such an interpretation risks subverting legislative supremacy at the State\u00a0 level. If gubernatorial discretion is stretched too far, it effectively allows the unelected office\u00a0 to override the mandate of an elected assembly, eroding federal balance. Attorney General\u00a0 Venkataramani, while arguing in the Apex Court, drew attention to the 42<\/span>nd<\/span> Amendment of\u00a0 1976, which explicitly bound the President to act on the advice of the Union Cabinet under\u00a0 Article 74(1), while leaving Article 163 untouched. He argued that this asymmetry reflects a\u00a0 deliberate choice, unlike the President, Governors are not always bound by ministerial advice.\u00a0 Yet this interpretation overlooks the political context of the Emergency. The 42<\/span>nd<\/span> Amendment\u00a0 was crafted in December 1976, when all States were under Central control. The amendment\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

sought to concentrate power at the Centre, restraining the President but leaving Governors as\u00a0 flexible instruments of central authority. The fact that subsequent governments retained this\u00a0 provision reveals political convenience rather than principled constitutional design. To invoke\u00a0 the 42<\/span>nd<\/span> Amendment as a justification for arbitrary gubernatorial power today risks repeating\u00a0 the authoritarian tendencies of the Emergency. The deeper question is whether the Centre\u00a0 intends to respect federalism or to diminish it into a mere formal construct, thereby risking a\u00a0 return to an Emergency era authoritarian government, rather than honoring the constitutional\u00a0 spirit of cooperative federalism.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Centre-State Relations: A Historical Evolution\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Until 1967, centre-state relations remained largely smooth under Congress’s dominance at both\u00a0 the centre and state levels. The electoral setback of the Congress in nine states in 1967 marked\u00a0 the beginning of a new era, as opposition ruled states challenged growing centralization and\u00a0 demanded greater autonomy. Since then, Governors have frequently become instruments of\u00a0 political maneuvering, used by the Centre to destabilize state governments.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Constituent Assembly, while rejecting the ideal of elected Governors, emphasized their\u00a0 neutrality. B.R. Ambedkar argued that the Centre and States would function in separate\u00a0 domains unless an internal emergency arose. The office of the Governor was designed as an\u00a0 impartial constitutional head, not as a political agent of the Centre. The Apex Court too has\u00a0 clarified that the Governor is not an employee of the Central government but an independent\u00a0 constitutional office. Nevertheless, political practice has often departed from this principle.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Several commissions have highlighted the dangers of excessive centralization and misuse of\u00a0 the Governor\u2019s office. Administrative Reforms Commission (1966), chaired by Morarji Desai,\u00a0 has stressed the need for Governors to adopt a non-partisan attitude for effective coordination.\u00a0 Sarkaria Commission (1988) warned that \u201cover centralization leads to blood pressure at the\u00a0 Centre and anaemia at the periphery,\u201d recommending that if assent is withheld, reasons should\u00a0 be communicated to the state government. Punchhi Commission (2007) emphasized\u00a0 \u201cCooperative federalism\u201d as the key to sustaining India\u2019s unity and recommended that\u00a0 Governors should decide on Bills within six months. The Apex court\u2019s ruling on many matters,\u00a0 along with these recommendations, reflects a consistent theme that \u201cthe Governor must act as\u00a0 a constitutional guardian, not as an agent of the Centre.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The centre\u2019s arguments rest heavily on the literal reading of Article 200, which omits timelines.\u00a0 But constitutional interpretation cannot be confined to the text alone, it must also reflect the\u00a0 spirit. The phrase \u201cas soon as possible\u201d was not meant to allow indefinite delay. Rather, it\u00a0 reflects the framers expectations of constitutional morality, that Governors would act swiftly,\u00a0 using discretion only in exceptional cases such as anti-constitutional or secessionist legislation.\u00a0 The framers decision to employ the expression \u201cunion of India\u201d rather than \u201cFederation\u201d was\u00a0 shaped profoundly by the traumatic experience of Partition. While the term \u201cFederation\u201d was\u00a0 consciously avoided, the constitution nonetheless incorporates all substantive features of\u00a0 federalism. Hypothetically, if a leader with overwhelming parliamentary dominance were to\u00a0 argue, on the basis of nomenclature alone, that India is not a federation and could thereby alter\u00a0 its federal character, such a claim might appear textually defensible. However, a principled\u00a0 reading of the Constitution reveals that federalism forms part of its basic structure. The framers\u00a0 intent was to forestall further secessionist tendencies, not to establish an authoritarian Centre.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

To invoke this historical choice as a rationale for expanding arbitrary gubernatorial powers is,\u00a0 therefore, a distortion of the constitutional spirit.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Governor\u2019s office was never intended to be a partisan tool of the Centre. Yet in practice,\u00a0 successive governments have used it to interfere in State politics. The present controversy\u00a0 illustrates the recurring tension between the letter and spirit of the Constitution. If the Centre\u00a0 insists on interpreting Article 200 literally, allowing Governors to withhold assent indefinitely,\u00a0 it risks undermining federalism and legislative supremacy in the states. Judicial intervention,\u00a0 therefore, becomes necessary to preserve constitutional balance.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Ultimately, the debate is not about the power of individuals but about the health of Indian\u00a0 democracy. If the Governor is allowed to become an instrument of central dominance,\u00a0 federalism, the core of the Constitution, will be eroded. The path forward must be one of\u00a0 cooperative federalism, guided by constitutional morality rather than political expediency.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Author: \u00a0Ashish Kumar Singh, law Student at faculty of law, DU The recent Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) has reignited one of the oldest debates\u00a0 in Indian constitutionalism, \u2018the role of Governors in a federal polity\u2019. Triggered by the\u00a0 Supreme Court\u2019s April 8, 2025 judgment in the State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":5037,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[85],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5683"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5683"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5683\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5690,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5683\/revisions\/5690"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5037"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5683"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5683"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5683"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}