{"id":4159,"date":"2024-12-28T16:12:16","date_gmt":"2024-12-28T10:42:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/?p=4159"},"modified":"2024-12-28T16:23:15","modified_gmt":"2024-12-28T10:53:15","slug":"vineeta-sharma-v-rakesh-sharma-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/2024\/12\/28\/vineeta-sharma-v-rakesh-sharma-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020)"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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Shamyana Parveen from Bikash Bharti Law College, Calcutta University<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t

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\u00a0<\/p>\n

Background of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma<\/b><\/p>\n

The case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma dealt with the interpretation of amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which granted daughters equal coparceny rights as sons. The amendment, effective from 9th November 2005, raised questions about whether daughters born before 2005 could claim these rights and if both father and daughter needed to be alive on 9th November 2005 for the provisions to apply.<\/span><\/p>\n

Previous judgments like Prakash v. Phulvati and\u00a0Danamma v. Amar\u00a0had conflicting views on the retrospective or prospective nature of these rights. To resolve these issues, a three-judge bench was set up to clarify the correct interpretation of Section 6 and address related cases for consistency in the law.<\/span><\/p>\n

Fact of the issue<\/b><\/p>\n

The following fact of the issues have been answered in the verdict by the apex court<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  • Whether the father coparcener should be living as on 9 November 2005?<\/span><\/li>\n
  • Whether a daughter born before 9 November 2005 can claim equal rights and liabilities in coparcenary as that of a son?<\/span><\/li>\n
  • Whether the statutory fiction of partition created by provision to section 6 of the hindu succession act, 1956 as originally enacted brings about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary?<\/span><\/li>\n
  • Whether a plea of oral partition after 20 December 2004 can be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition?<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Issues Raised<\/b><\/h2>\n

    The apex court\u2019s verdict addressed the following key issues:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    • Whether the father coparcener needed to be alive on 9 November 2005?<\/span><\/li>\n
    • Whether a daughter born before 9 November 2005 could claim equal rights and liabilities in coparcenary as a son?<\/span><\/li>\n
    • Whether the statutory fiction of partition created by the proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, actually resulted in partition or disruption of coparceny?<\/span><\/li>\n
    • Whether a plea of oral partition after 20 December 2004 be accepted as a statutorily recognised mode of partition?<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Arguments<\/b><\/p>\n

      Shri Tushar Mehta, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, presented arguments that were in line with the actual judgement itself. He argued that genuine partitions effectuated before 20.12.2004, which was the date of announcement of the amendment bill in the Rajya sabha should be left untouched as it would adversely affect the position of law, if they were questioned. It was agreed upon by Solicitor general that a coparceners father need not be alive during the amendment act for daughter to have coparcenary rights, as \u2018(T)he death of the coparcener \/father does not automatically lead to the end of coparcenary, which may continue with other coparcener alive.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n

      Shri R. Venkataramani, who argues as amicus curiae argued that in both of the previous judgements it is held that the provisions are of prospective nature and hence there is no conflict between these judgements. He contended that the reason why daughter is treated equal to son in reference to coparcenary rights is only because of the amendment act and not because she was born. The father\/coparcener must be a living coparcener or otherwise there will be no coparceny interest left as to succeed to the daughter.<\/span><\/p>\n

      According to his arguments, if the daughter will be treated as if she was a coparcener before 09.09.2005 an \u2018enormous uncertainty\u2019 will occur in the \u2018working of the law\u2019. He states that \u2018(T) he parliament has not intended to scramble the unscrambled egg or to resurrect the past\u2019, and accordingly, the intention of the parliament is forward looking.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Shri V.V.S. Rao, learned amicus curia argued that the plain language and future perfect tense \u2018 shall have the same rights\u2019 and phrases like \u2018 on and from \u2018 in section 6(1) , and words like \u2018become\u2019, \u2018have\u2019, \u2019be\u2019 indicate that the intention of the parliament was to apply the provisions of the Amendment act prospectively and not retrospectively. He asserted that the daughter will be subject to pious obligation only from 09.09.2005 and no for any property acquired before this date.<\/span><\/p>\n

      He further argued that the father\/coparcener should be alive as on 09.09.2005 because if the coparcenary was disrupted by the act of parties or death of any one or more parties, there will be no coparcenary property intact, which may be inherited by the daughter. This position of law cannot be changed as \u2018the status conferred cannot affect the past transactions of alienation, disposition, and partition oral or written\u2019. And hence he concluded that there should be a living coparcener so that the daughter may inherit and become a coparcener.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Shri Sridhar Potraju, on behalf of the respondent, argued that if a notional partition has taken place it should be recognised. He contended that a preliminary decree should be considered to be finalised as it denotes that the (J)jointness of the Hindu family has ended with \u2018mere filing of the suit for partition\u2019. He asserted and reiterated that the provisions are meant to be prospective in nature because such interpretation is not sought through which crystallised rights of the surviving coparcener are taken away and consequently, settled affairs are unsettled. Relying on Uppaluri Hari Narayana & Ors. He reiterated that liabilities can be transferred to the daughter only from the date of amendment as the provisions are not retrospective. He further asserted that all past transactions should stay protected from any effects of the amendment as on a statutory partition, the property becomes the self-acquired property and is no more a coparcener property.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Shri Amit Pai and Shri Sameer Shrivastav argued that if both the coparcener and the daughter should be alive after the commencement of the Amendment act, it would defeat the purpose and objective of the act which is to abolish the disparity between sons and daughters. They argued that coparcenary arises due to birth and the only exception to this rule is the process of adoption. However, they agree on this point that if a partition is genuinely effectuated then the daughter should not seek partition of an already divided property.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma Judgement<\/b><\/p>\n

      The verdict of the Supreme Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma clarified several crucial aspects regarding the\u00a0coparcenary rights\u00a0of daughters in Hindu joint family property. The court emphasised that joint Hindu family property is considered unobstructed heritage, where the right to partition is inherent from birth. This means that whether the father coparcener was alive or dead on the date of the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 2005 is immaterial to the daughter\u2019s right to inherit. The court ruled that the amendment granting equal coparcenary rights to daughters is retroactive, meaning it applies from the date of birth of the daughter, not from the date of the amendment.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The court in Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma also addressed the concept of notional partition, stating that it does not necessarily result in an actual partition of the property. Notional partition is a legal fiction used to determine the shares of coparceners in the joint family property and it does not affect the daughter\u2019s right to claim her share. The court clarified that even if a preliminary decree for partition has been passed, it is not final and can be modified based on subsequent events such as the birth of a new coparcener or the death of an existing one.<\/span><\/p>\n

      To prevent abuse and fraudulent claims of\u00a0partition, the court ruled that any partition after 20 December 2004 must be genuine and registered or decreed by a court. Oral partitions are not accepted as a defence unless supported by strong evidence such as separate possession of family members, different appropriation of income, entries in revenue records or other public documents confirming the partition.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The court in Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma clarified that an oral partition cannot serve as a defence unless it is proven to be genuine through specific evidence. While some oral partitions may be valid, the burden of proof lies heavily on the defence. To substantiate an oral partition, one or more of the following pieces of evidence must be presented to the court:<\/span><\/p>\n

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      • Separate possession of family:<\/b>\u00a0Members must be living separately, indicating a dissolution of the joint Hindu family before the partition.<\/span><\/li>\n
      • Appropriation of income:\u00a0<\/b>If the family is separated and a partition has occurred, income should be appropriated differently or in the case of a business, the enterprise must have been divided and shared.<\/span><\/li>\n
      • Entry in revenue records:<\/b>\u00a0There should be sufficient entries in revenue records confirming the separation of family members.<\/span><\/li>\n
      • Other public documents:\u00a0<\/b>An official public document must verify that the partition has been genuinely effectuated. Without such evidence, the court will not recognise an oral partition as valid, ensuring that daughters are not deprived of their equal rights through fabricated partitions.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma Summary<\/b><\/p>\n

        Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma was a landmark case in Indian law concerning the coparcenary rights of daughters in Hindu joint families. The case revolved around the interpretation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, particularly whether daughters born before the amendment in 2005 were entitled to equal coparcenary rights as sons.<\/span><\/p>\n

        The Supreme Court clarified that the amended provisions applied retrospectively from the date of the Act\u2019s enactment, giving daughters equal rights in coparcenary property. The court also addressed issues related to notional partition, emphasising the need for genuine partitions after 2004 to prevent misuse. This judgment has had significant implications for gender equality and property rights in Hindu families.<\/span><\/p>\n

        Conclusion<\/b><\/p>\n

        Apex court has overruled the judgement and it has agreed on some points of law in danamma but has partially overruled it as according to dannama the provisions of section 6 have prospective effect. The court has cleared many lacunas in law such that notional partition is not actual partition, the provisions are retroactive in nature, whether father is dead or alive on and after 9 November 2005 is immaterial to the conferring of equal rights to the daughter as same as the son and that the rights of coparcenary are conferred on daughter by birth.<\/span><\/p>\n

        The Supreme Court has also interpreted the legislation according to its objectives which was to make good a fault in law as the unamended section 6 of Hindu succession act was discriminatory in nature. Accordingly, it has laid down precedents that will ensure that no bogus or sham partitions can lead to deprivation of an equal right of a daughter in Hindu joint family. This judgement successfully cleared all the confusion created by two contradicting judgements before it.<\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Shamyana Parveen from Bikash Bharti Law College, Calcutta University \u00a0 Background of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma The case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma dealt with the interpretation of amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which granted daughters equal coparceny rights as sons. The amendment, effective from 9th November 2005, raised […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4057,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[97],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4159"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4159"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4159\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4163,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4159\/revisions\/4163"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4057"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4159"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4159"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawjurist.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4159"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}